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Here (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Vo1FqhbqVCI ) is the video of the 
research seminar which took place on November 25th, 2015, on the subject of ‘Can 
Composition and Performance be Research?’, which featured a panel made up 
of Christopher Fox (Professor of Composition at Brunel University and editor of 
Tempo), myself (pianist and Head of Performance at City University), Miguel Mera 
(composer and Head of the Department of Music at City University), Annie Yim 
(pianist and DMA student at City University), and Camden Reeves (composer and 
Head of Music, University of Manchester). Christine Dysers (PhD student in Music at 
City University) was unable to be present due to illness, but a statement by here was 
read out by Sam MacKay (PhD student in Music at City University and organiser of 
the seminar). The session was chaired by Alexander Lingas (Undergraduate 
Programme Director and Reader in Music, City University). Greatest of thanks are 
also due to Bruno Mathez for making and editing the video. 
 
A short article in response to the occasion has been posted at the City University 
Music Department has been posted by PhD student in music Roya Arab. 
The panellists were responding to two key articles: John Croft’s ‘Composition is 
Not Research’, Tempo 69/272 (April 2015), pp. 6-11, and my own ‘Composition 
and Performance can be, and often have been, Research’, Tempo 70/275 (January 
2016), pp. 60-70. As of this week, Camden Reeves’ article ‘Composition, Research 
and Pseudo-Science: A Response to John Croft’, Tempo 70/275 (January 2016), pp. 
50-59, and Croft’s reply to Reeves and myself, ‘Composition, Research and Ways of 
Talking’, Tempo 70/275 (January 2016), pp. 71-77, have been published – these are 
not yet available via open access, but can be downloaded from Tempo for those with 
access to this. 
 
Here I wanted to summarise the arguments I presented at the forum, and also respond 
to some of Croft’s response. Some of my thinking has moved on a little from the 
positions I outlined in my Tempo article (which I acknowledge may contain some 
inner contradictions or inconsistencies), but the majority of positions presented there 
are ones I continue to uphold. 
 
The debate has been dominated by the issue of whether composition can be research, 
with much less attention given to performance; I would like to redress that balance. I 
believe that it is tacitly accepted that a musical composition is likely to qualify as 
some type of research much more than is the case for musical performances and 
recordings. This is reflected in the relative numbers of composers and performers 
employed in academic positions in universities. I have compiled some approximate 
figures for the situation as it exists in autumn 2015, in large measure using data 
derived from departments’ own websites. These figures are slightly modified and 
checked from those given at the seminar – if anyone notices any other omissions or 
major errors, do let me know and I will make the appropriate corrections. 
 
There are 53 departments offering various types of music or music-related degree 
[Edit: Some other departments could also be included, which I will add when editing 
this post at some point in the near future], excluding the ten UK conservatoires, in 
which the status of composition and performance is of a different nature. These are as 
follows: 
 
Russell Group (19): King’s College and Queen Mary, University of London; 
Birmingham; Bristol; Cambridge; Durham; Leeds; Liverpool; Manchester; 
Newcastle; Nottingham; Oxford; Sheffield; Southampton; York; Cardiff; Edinburgh; 
Glasgow; Queen’s University, Belfast. 
Mid-ranking Institutions (‘Other’) (13): Royal Holloway and Goldsmith’s Colleges, 
and School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London; City University; 
Brunel; Hull; Keele; Open University; Salford; Surrey; Sussex; Bangor; Aberdeen. 
Post-1992 Institutions (received university status after 1992) (21): West London; East 
London; London Metropolitan; Westminster; Middlesex; Kingston; Anglia Ruskin; 
Bath Spa; Brighton; Canterbury Christ Church; Chichester; De Montfort; Falmouth; 
Hertfordshire; Huddersfield; Liverpool Hope; Oxford Brookes; Winchester; 
Wolverhampton; Edinburgh Napier; Ulster. 
 
I have looked only at composers and performers employed in academic positions (i.e. 
integrated into the academic career structure from Lecturer to Professor) at these 
institutions. On the basis of research outputs, I have counted those composers and/or 
performers who have also produced a fair number of written outputs as being ‘0.5’s 
for the purposes of counting. I have counted only university (not college) 
appointments at Oxford and Cambridge. By this method, I arrive at the following 
figures: 
All Universities 
Total Staff: 691 
Composers: 198 (28.7%) 
Performers: 76 (11%) 
Practitioners: 274 (39.7%) 
Russell Group 
Total Staff: 318 
Composers: 89.5 (28.1%) 
Performers: 21 (6.6%) 
Practitioners: 110.5 (34.7%) 
Mid-Ranking Institutions 
Total Staff: 160 
Composers: 45.5 (28.4%) 
Performers: 13 (8.1%) 
Practitioners: 58.5 (36.5%) 
Post-1992 Institutions 
Total Staff: 213 
Composers: 63 (29.6%) 
Performers: 42 (19.7%) 
Practitioners: 105 (49.3%) 
Thus there is a ratio of around 4.3:1 of composers to performers at Russell Group 
institutions, 3.5:1 at mid-ranking institutions, but 3:2 for post-1992 institutions. 
Performance is clearly less regularly valued as an academic field of study in the more 
prestige institutions, compared to composition (where the representation is very 
similar across the sector). 
There is a highly sophisticated debate (and concomitant outputs) on practice-as-
research in fields such as theatre and dance (my own former institution, Dartington 
College of Arts, was at the forefront of this). The apparently clear distinction between 
‘creative’ and ‘professional’ practice mentioned by Mera in the seminar is however 
far from clear-cut; it is widely debated and problematized in critical literature, rarely 
defined clearly, and some departments elide the distinction by using concepts such as 
‘Creative Professional Practice’. In comparison to all of this, the debate in music has 
been rather elementary. Composition has been an accepted academic field for a long 
time, like fine art and drama; but changes in the RAE/REF in the mid-1990s, allowing 
the submission of practice-based outputs, forced a re-thinking of this. It is in this 
context that more fundamental questions about the status of composition and 
performance in academia have come to the fore, as they have had to consider the 
types of issues and paradigms developed in other practice-centered disciplines. 
I believe that practically all composition and performance are research in some sense; 
in the case of musical performance the following would be some of the types of 
research questions that any performer has to answer in order to play a piece of music: 
o Which tempi should be used for various large-scale sections of the score in question? 
o How much flexibility should be employed within these broad tempi? 
o On a smaller scale, what forms of stylisation and elasticity would be most appropriate for 
playing various types of rhythms? 
o Through various combinations of accentuation, articulation and rhythm, to what extent, and 
where, should one tend towards continuity of line, or more angular approaches? 
o In polyphonic or contrapuntal textures, to what extent should one be aiming to project a 
singular voice which is foregrounded above others, or a greater degree of dynamic equilibrium 
between parts 
o Should one aim for a singular prominent climactic point within a movement, or can there be 
several of roughly equal prominence? 
 
I could continue with many more; what is important is that by articulating them in this 
fashion I am not simply making explicit what might as well remain implicit in the acts 
of musical preparation and performance, but also underlining the fact of their 
being choices in various respects, not necessarily something which all performers 
acknowledge (inwardly or outwardly) or act upon. ‘Gigging’ performers, or those 
who value primarily ‘intuitive’ approaches, might be amongst those less likely to be 
concerned about the possibilities of rational choices in the process of preparing a 
performance or recording. 
 
But even if most practice is a type of research, there remain different levels of which 
such research is conducted – though this is equally true of written work. The question 
of ‘is X research?’ is banal and inconsequential; what matters is how we determine 
equivalence of quality between different manifestations of research. We should be 
wary of over-rating either practice-based or written work which entails a fraction of 
the thought, prior skills, time and rigour of the most intensive types of research, and 
ensure a critical research culture exists amongst practitioners if musical institutions 
are to be more than dressed-up low level conservatoires. 
The possibilities for peer review of work whose output is in the form of practice have 
not been sufficiently explored, and I propose we need a ‘space’, equivalent to a 
journal, for reviewing and then either publishing (where outputs can be placed 
online), or simply detailing and drawing attention to (where outputs are copyrighted 
elsewhere) creative work. I would welcome any communications from others who 
might be interested in trying to set such a thing up. 
Various participants in the seminar appeared to assume that I did not believe that 
practice could be research unless accompanied by a written component. This is by no 
means my belief; rather I have questioned whether some relatively unreflective 
practice should be considered equivalent to more traditional forms of research, but 
would again emphasise that these questions also apply to some types of written 
output. Mera pointed out my comments on popular and cultural studies, in which 
fields I find great variety of quality, and suggested this is true of much work on 
contemporary music too: I would wholeheartedly agree, and have argued as much on 
this blog, as well as in various book reviews and review-articles which have appeared 
recently (as in my extended study of critical reception of Brian Ferneyhough, in 
which I have given a harsh view of hagiographical writing). 
I wish to add a few comments on some points made by Croft in his response to my 
article. There are many problems with this response and ways in which I believe he 
misrepresents various of the figures he critiques, but I will limit myself here to his 
responses to my article. Croft writes the following: 
The distinction at work here, loosely put, is between discovery and invention. Before my critics leap on 
this statement with accusations of essentialism or definition-mania, let me repeat that an attempt 
to characterise something is not an essentialising move – it is, however, an attempt to get at a 
fundamental difference between two types of activity: describing and presenting;                    
                                                      I ’  hardly a new idea, and deserves more than the 
breezy dismissal it receives, both from Reeves and from Ian Pace in his response. Einstein was not just 
‘            h   ’  He was describing the world. A composer, on the other hand, is making an 
addition to the world that is not primarily descriptive. (And no, not like a smartphone or a 
blancmange.) 
 
Smartphones and blancmanges aside (why are they so fundamentally different to 
musical composition in terms of their relationship to description?), I do not accept that 
either Reeves’ response nor my own entail a ‘breezy dismissal’; in my own case I 
dispute how clear-cut is the dichotomy presented by Croft. He goes on to locate cases 
within literature on practice-as-research which themselves frame the concept of 
research so as to include creative practice, with which I would agree. The following 
is the definition of research supplied by the REF: 
 
1. For the purposes of the REF, research is defined as a process of investigation leading to new 
insights, effectively shared.  
2. It includes work of direct relevance to the needs of commerce, industry, and to the public and 
voluntary sectors; scholarship; the invention and generation of ideas, images, performances, artefacts 
including design, where these lead to new or substantially improved insights; and the use of existing 
knowledge in experimental development to produce new or substantially improved materials, devices, 
products and processes, including design and construction. It excludes routine testing and routine 
analysis of materials, components and processes such as for the maintenance of national standards, as 
distinct from the development of new analytical techniques. It also excludes the development of 
teaching materials that do not embody original research.  
3. It includes research that is published, disseminated or made publicly available in the form of 
assessable research outputs, and confidential reports (as defined at paragraph 115 in Part 3, Section 
2). (p. 48) 
 
I do not know why Croft is resistant to this type of highly inclusive definition, though 
suspect (as indicated in my Tempo article) that this reflects an analytical/positivist 
philosophical bent rather than the more synthetic and idealistic attitude which I find 
more enlightening. Research does not merely describe the world, but can create new 
forms of perception and experience, such as are fundamental to artistic creation. One 
does not have to be a postmodern relativist (I am certainly not) to see that research 
can shape rather than merely identify reality. Composition does not come from 
nowhere, and all music is produced and heard in relation to other music and sonic 
phenomena; to treat musical creation independently of reference (whether or not 
willed by the composer) is in my view simplistic. Croft goes on to conclude: 
 
This is not the place to launch a critique of STS [Science and Technology Studies], but I do 
think practice-as-research is in trouble if it depends on a view of science that confuses ideas and things 
so profoundly. However, Pace seems to espouse a version of this view in his suggestion that, if 
Einstein had not come up with relativity, someone else might have come up with an ‘       y different 
        ’ instead. Most physicists would find this idea absurd.  (p. 75) 
 
The above relies on a flagrant misquotation; in my Tempo article I wrote the 
following: 
 
It is by no means necessarily true that, as Croft says ‘   Einstein had not existed, someone else would 
have come up with R     v  y’  someone might have come up with a quite different, but equally 
influential paradigm. (p. 68) 
Nowhere here or elsewhere in the article do I use the phrase ‘entirely different 
paradigm’. The point is that ‘Relativity’ is not itself the phenomena being identified, 
but a scientific model use to give shape to external phenomena. I will leave it to 
others to debate whether this was the only possible model which could have been 
used, or for that matter whether this model will always remain undisputed in the 
future. 
Croft also writes: 
Pace, at one point, agrees that composition is ‘    intrinsically resea ch’  but that it might entail 
various activities that are research. If this is his view, we do not disagree; this is exactly what I said in 
my original article. But at another point he states that ‘      ch’ is just a word for what composers 
have always been doing, except for the additional requirement of supporting text. One interpretation of 
this might be that composition is research, and the text simply points out how – but this would 
contradict the earlier statement that composition is not intrinsically research. Another would be that 
composition is not research until turned into research by the text. This certainly      ’  square with 
our usual use of the word ‘      ch’  You could, in principle, do scientific, literary or historical 
research without writing anything down. Moreover, if documentation can turn non-research into 
research, this undermines the ‘          h      ’ justification for practice-as-research: if we take this 
line seriously, then compositional knowledge-how would not be amenable to translation into 
knowledge-that. This is a far cry from P c ’  insistence on ‘ x   c   articulation to facilitate 
integration into academic     c     ’  (p. 76) 
And furthermore: 
Pace seems to think that without such an accompanying text, composing becomes merely a matter of 
composers composing ‘   the way they always have     ’  This points, perhaps, to a tendency to 
dismiss any idea of a domain of irreducible non-conceptual thought as some kind of romantic fantasy 
of ineffability. I have no problem with ‘ pening a w    w’ on the compositional process, but when this 
is anything but superficial, it is often poetic and rarely in the language of aims and objectives; nor is it 
a matter of ‘        x   c  ’ for the purposes of ‘           ’  as Pace puts it. Amenability to such 
language does not turn something into research, as we have seen; but in any case, much of what makes 
music meaningful is generally resistant to such ‘           ’  (p. 77) 
Here is what I wrote: 
C    ’  basic formulation that composition is not intrinsically research is one I accept in this naked 
form, and I would say the same about performance. But both are outputs, which can entail a good deal 
of research. A new type of blancmange or smartphone may not themselves be intrinsically research 
either (nor, as Lauren Redhead vitally points out, is writing), but few would have a problem seeing 
them as valid research-based outputs. (p. 64) 
All I am arguing there is that an output is not itself research but the product of 
research. Croft could as easily read the above as saying that writing is not research, 
and dismiss all attempts to produce written articles and books, as he uses it to suggest 
that I am supporting his position. Another passage to which he refers is: 
Unlike Croft, I believe that composition-as-research, and performance-as-research (and performance-
based research) are real activities; the terms themselves are just new ways to describe what has gone 
on earlier, with the addition of a demand for explicit articulation to facilitate integration into academic 
structures. (p. 70) 
This needs to be read in the context of these previous statements: 
Ultimately his [Croft’s] model of research seems to require a particular type of conceptually based 
knowledge which can be communicated verbally, which I find too narrow. (p. 64) 
 
What is being asked, not unfairly, of a composer employed in a research-intensive university is that 
at the least they verbally articulate the questions, issues, aims and objectives, and stages of 
compositional activity, to open a window onto the process and offer the potential of use to others. As a 
performer I am happy to do this (and wish more performers would do so) and I do not see why it 
should be a problem for composers too (the argument that this is unnecessary, as all of this can be 
communicated solely through the work itself, is one I find too utopian). (p. 67) 
Nor does musical practice become research simply by virtue of being accompanied by a 
programme note, which funding and other committees can look at while ignoring the practical 
work. (p. 69) 
 
I am a bit more reticent about the second of these statements now than when I wrote 
the article. The point here was a pragmatic one, which might be somewhat at odds 
with the sentiments elsewhere. Documenting process can surely do no harm, and 
indeed do a lot of good in terms of clarifying and facilitating the dissemination of 
research, but on the other hand one should not necessarily privilege written outputs in 
this respect, as I said in the talk. But this does not contradict my basic view that 
practice can be research independently of any written element, in strong distinction to 
the position Croft (and at first Mera) appear to attribute to me. Documentation does 
not make something research, just help a little with making research more 
accessible. 300 word statements hardly seem a huge price to pay, though I remain 
somewhat in two minds about this point. 
I also wrote: 
Composers may wish to be paid a salary to compose or perform in the way they always have done, but 
perhaps they would then be better employed on a teaching contract for composition with the 
recognition and remuneration for their composition or performance coming from elsewhere. (p. 67) 
All I am saying here is that composers should not automatically assume they are high-
level academics, any more than should those who write articles and book chapters. It 
hardly seems so unfair that they are held to research standards just like other types of 
academics. 
Croft takes further exception to my arguments here: 
P c ’  suggestion that composition is somehow a less demanding activity for an academic to 
undertake, and that it needs the words to make up the difference, hardly warrants a response and has 
no bearing on the question at hand. (pp. 76-7) 
I wrote: 
I have some doubts as to whether some composition- and performance- based PhDs, especially those 
not even requiring a written component, are really equivalent in terms of effort, depth and rigour with 
the more conventional types. (p. 69) 
This is the same point as I made about composers expecting to have to put in no extra 
effort when working in universities. But Croft neglects my qualifier ‘some’. I have 
certainly seen some other PhDs which are absolutely on a par with more conventional 
types, just believe these are not always typical. 
I end with my fundamental point: trying to provide very exclusive definitions of 
‘research’ is fruitless; what is needed is to find equitable ways of assessing 
composition, performance, written and other types of outputs in ways which do not 
put any work at a disadvantage simply because of the form of the output. 
 
